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Administrative Procedure and the
Internal Revenue Service: Delimiting the
Substantial Understatement Penalty
Peter A. Appel
In the early 1980's, Congress faced the mounting problems of tax shel-
ters and other forms of tax avoidance. It responded by passing a series of
laws.1 One of these provisions, section 6661 of the Internal Revenue Code,
penalizes "substantial understatement" of tax liability.2 While section
6661 may appear to be a typical, innocuous tax code provision, close ex-
amination reveals that the substantial understatement penalty threatens to
expand quietly the power of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) over tax-
payers, violating the spirit of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in
the process.
In exercising their rulemaking power, agencies must generally observe
the notice and comment proceedings mandated by the APA in 5 U.S.C. §
553.3 There are, however, a number of exceptions to the APA's notice and
comment requirement,4 one of the most important of which covers "inter-
1. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
Congress recently amended the 1986 Code in the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (102 Stat.) 3342 (to be codified
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Among the many new provisions was subtitle J, entitled the Omni-
bus Taxpayer Bill of Rights. Id. §§ 6226-6247, 102 Stat. at 3730-52:
2. I.R.C. § 6661 (1986).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982).
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pretative rules."5 In theory, interpretative rules represent only policy de-
terminations or litigating positions for the agency. In practice, however,
courts often defer to the agency's decision and give it the force of law.'
Each year the IRS issues a vast number of rulings standardizing tax-
payer liability to the government, including Treasury regulations, revenue
rulings, and revenue procedures. Although Treasury regulations are usu-
ally promulgated after notice and comment, revenue rulings and revenue
procedures-which courts generally characterize as interpretative-are
not subjected to that procedure. Through its interpretations of section
6661, the IRS has, in effect, declared that its interpretative pronounce-
ments represent binding law for taxpayers and their counsel, and disobe-
dience will result in penalties.7 Because of this provision, the possibility
now exists that the interpretative rules of the IRS will have effects beyond
their content that dictates substantive tax liability.' Such an outcome
threatens to undermine administrative law principles.
Section I of this Note explores the background of section 6661 and its
interpretation by the Department of Treasury. Section II explains the
first problem with the Regulation,' namely the compulsion of taxpayer
deference to IRS interpretative rules. Section III discusses how Treasury's
interpretation of 6661 limits the authorities that taxpayers may cite to
avoid the penalty, excluding some authorities that taxpayers may refer to
when they are trying to escape substantive tax liability. Section IV ex-
plores whether the proposed solutions could come from courts or whether
they must emanate from Congress. The deference courts pay to adminis-
5. 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A) (1982). Although many commentators prefer the term "interpretive," see,
e.g., Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 381 n.4, the
Act uses the term "interpretative."
6. Many scholars have commented on the increased deference that courts accord interpretative
rules. See, e.g., Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a Proposal
for Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346; Note, The Substantial Impact Test: Victim of the
Falloutfrom Vermont Yankee?, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 118 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Substantial
Impact Test]. Other commentators have noted the problem of interpretative rules, both in the context
of taxation and more generally, and have suggested different alternatives. See Asimow, supra note 5
(noting problems with pre-adoption notice and comment, and suggesting use of notice and comment
after adopting interpretative rule); Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive
Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REv. 520 (1977) (suggesting post-adoption notice and
comment); Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making of Interpreta-
tive Rules and General Statements of Policy Under the A.P.A., 23 ADMIN. L. REv. 101 (1971)
(suggesting further study of problem); Koch, Public Procedures for the Promulgation of Interpreta-
tive Rules and General Statements of Policy, 64 GEo. L.J. 1047 (1976) (suggesting repeal of APA
exemption for interpretative rules or development by courts of substantive impact doctrine); Saunders,
supra (courts should apply combination of substantial impact test and agency intention to find inter-
pretative rules); Comment, A Functional Approach to the Applicability of Section 553 of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act to Agency Statements of Policy, 43 U. CHI. L. Rav. 430 (1976) (advocating
substantial impact doctrine); Note, Revenue Rulings and the Federal Administrative Procedure Act,
1975 Wis. L. REv. 1135 (advising practitioners).
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-3 (1985).
8. Throughout this Note, the phrase "substantive liability" will refer to the amount of tax that a
taxpayer should declare on her return. See I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2) (1986). Section 6661 imposes a pen-
alty in addition to any substantive liability.
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-3 (1985).
[Vol. 98: 14351436
HeinOnline  -- 98 Yale L. J. 1436 1988-1989
Administrative Procedure and the IRS
trative agencies suggests that judicial adoption of this Note's proposed
reading might be precluded. This conclusion might provide impetus to
Congress to revisit not only the words of section 6661 but also the issue of
judicial deference to administrative agencies generally. °
I. BACKGROUND: TAXING SYSTEMS AND THE TAX PENALTY
Section 6661 is part of a larger system of penalizing those taxpayers
who misstate or otherwise fail to pay their taxes. By referring to "author-
ity," section 6661 alludes to a large body of administrative pronounce-
ments that the IRS issues yearly.
A. The Tax Avoidance Problem and Congressional Responses
Taxpayers in the United States often play the "audit lottery," gambling
that the Service will not catch questionable positions on their returns be-
cause there are too many returns for the IRS to review each one care-
fully." In the late 1970's, the potential costs of taking an aggressive posi-
tion on a tax return were low. Chances were that the IRS would not
audit, and even if it did, the Code had few provisions to penalize anyone
but taxpayers who fraudulently evaded tax liability. Thus, if a taxpayer
faced an audit and lost, she would only have to pay the back taxes plus
any interest.1 2 Since the statutory interest rates were often below the high
market interest rates of the late 1970's,a" taxpayers had great incentive to
understate their taxes.
Lawmakers had the option of responding to increasing tax avoidance in
two ways: penalizing underpayment of taxes, and forbidding or limiting
the substantive transactions that lead to tax avoidance. 4 The United
States has often pursued the latter form of control in response to the
proliferation of tax shelters. 5 Tax shelters have always existed, but in the
late 1970's, they exploded in number.
10. Many of the arguments made in this Note apply to other government agencies as well. This
Note focuses on the IRS because it poses unique problems for the scholar of administrative law.
Among other things, Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-3 (1985) is unusual because it requires individuals to defer
to interpretative rules, and threatens imposition of criminal-like fines for non-compliance.
11. See I S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 272-73, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 781, 1019-20 [hereinafter TEFRA SENATE REPORT]. Rather than figuring out every
citizen's taxes, the IRS relies heavily on accurate self-assessment for the bulk of returns. IRS, INTER-
NAL REVENUE MANUAL § (11)911 (1979), reprinted in 6 Internal Revenue Man-
ual-Administration (CCH) 35,951; see also 1985 IRS COMM'R & CHIEF COUNSEL ANN. REP. 12,
60 (1.31% of all individual returns audited).
12. TEFRA SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 272-73, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 1019-20.
13. M. GRAETz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 98 (2d ed. 1988).
14. The United States has taken both approaches; the 1982 Amendments created more penalties,
and the 1986 Code eliminated many of the substantive transactions that allowed tax avoidance. See
infra notes 16-18 & note 118.
15. Tax shelters are transactions that have little or no real economic benefit for the investor, until
she accounts for tax savings. See generally Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifjing and
Controlling Income Tax Avoidance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 657 (1985) (outlining main strategies of
1989] 1437
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In 1982, Congress enacted the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act (TEFRA),'0 and included section 666117 as a partial response to these
problems."8 Section 6661 imposes a penalty of twenty-five percent' 9 on
any "substantial understatement" of taxes.20 Taxpayers may avoid the
penalty if they adequately disclose their position2 or if they have "sub-
stantial authority" for the tax treatment of any item on their return, even
if their position is ultimately rejected.22 If the item involves a tax shelter,2 3
the taxpayer must meet the higher standard2 of showing that she "rea-
sonably believed that the tax treatment of such item . . . was more likely
than not the proper treatment." 25
Section 6661 differentiates between a taxpayer's substantive liability
and that taxpayer's substantial understatement liability, i.e. whether the
taxpayer's failure to assess her substantive liability correctly should lead
income tax shelters).
16. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
17. TEFRA § 323, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. at 613-15.
18. TEFRA included other penalties. TEFRA § 318, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. at 610 (codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 6651 (1986)) (penalty for late payment of taxes if failure to pay stems from willful
neglect and not reasonable cause); id. § 315, 96 Stat. at 605-07 (codified at I.R.C. § 6652 (1986))
(duty to report certain information, e.g. income from tips; I.R.C. § 6652(b) (1986)); id. § 325, 96
Stat. at 616-17 (codified at I.R.C. § 6653(a)(2)-(b) (1986)) (increased penalty for fraudulent or
negligent tax avoidance); id. § 316, 96 Stat. at 607 (codified at I.R.C. § 6676 (1986)) (penalizing
those who fail to report identification number on their returns); id. § 320, 96 Stat. at 611-12 (codified
at I.R.C. § 6700 (1986)) (penalizing promoters of abusive tax shelters); id. § 324, 96 Stat. at 615-16
(codified at I.R.C. § 6701 (1986)) (fine for aiding and abetting substantial understatement).
The Code also makes borrowing from the government (i.e., understating tax liability because statu-
tory interest rates applied to unpaid taxes are favorable) more expensive. Section 6621 establishes a
two-tiered interest rate structure. Compare I.R.C. § 6621(a)(1) (1986) (interest rate for underpay-
ments to government) with I.R.C. § 6621(a)(2) (1986) (overpayments of tax to government, as defined
in I.R.C. § 6611 (1986) earn less interest than that charged for underpayments to government). The
underpayment rate increases for substantial underpayments attributed to certain tax-motivated trans-
actions, I.R.C. § 6621(c) (1986), and interest compounds daily, I.R.C. § 6622 (1986).
19. While the original penalty was 10%, TEFRA § 323, 96 Stat. at 613-14, Congress simultane-
ously passed one law raising the penalty to 20% and one raising it to 25%. The Tax Court has held
that the higher penalty applies. See Pallottini v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 498 (1988).
20. I.R.C. § 6661(a) (1986). I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(A) (1986) defines "understatement" as the
amount of tax that the taxpayer should have reported minus the amount that the taxpayer did report.
I.R.C. § 6661(b)(1) (1986) defines "substantial understatement" as the greater of "10 percent of the
tax required to be shown on the return for the taxable year" and a set amount ($5,000 for individuals
and $10,000 for corporations).
21. I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(B)(i) (1986). The IRS defines "adequate disclosure" as a statement on a
Form 8275 or similar attachment to the taxpayer's return. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-4(b)(1) (1985). In
Schirmer v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 277 (1987), the Tax Court held that a taxpayer need only pro-
vide enough information to identify the potential controversy, but must do more than simply file a
return. Id. at 285-86. The Secretary of the Treasury may waive the understatement penalty "on a
showing by the taxpayer that there was reasonable cause for the understatement . . . and that the
taxpayer acted in good faith;" this applies both to regular transactions and tax shelters. I.R.C. §
6661(c) (1986). A reviewing court will apply an abuse of discretion standard to denials of the waiver.
Estate of Goodwin v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 702 (1988).
22. I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(B)(i) (1986).
23. Id. § 6661(b)(2)(C)(ii) defines tax shelter as any scheme, plan, or arrangement the purpose of
which "is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax."
24. I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(C) (1986); see Gjesteby v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 1364, 1375
(1987) (standard for authority more stringent if tax shelter involved).
25. Id. § 6661(b)(2)(C)(i)(II). Adequate disclosure, moreover, is no defense to the penalty in tax
shelter cases. Id. § 6661(b)(2)(C)(i)(I).
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to the penalty. Theoretically, three types of substantial understatement
cases could arise. First, there could be cases in which the Commissioner
loses on the substantive tax issue; in those cases, no penalty for substantial
understatement can be imposed.2" Second, there could be cases in which
the taxpayer owes both the tax and the penalty.2 Third, there could be
cases in which the taxpayer owes the tax but, because she had substantial
authority for her position, no penalty should be applied.28 This Note is
concerned primarily with the third category.
B. A Taxonomy of Modern Internal Revenue Service Pronouncements
Before delving further into this last category of cases, one needs to know
how the United States helps its citizens determine how much tax they
owe. Section 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary
of the Treasury to issue "all needful rules and regulations for the enforce-
ment" of the Code.29 In addition, the Service communicates its own posi-
tion on different issues to taxpayers in a number of different ways.30
The Treasury Department exercises its section 7805 authority most di-
rectly through Treasury regulations, which are codified as Title 26 of the
Code of Federal Regulations. Treasury usually issues these after notice
and comment, and often has hearings on the substance of the proposed
regulations. Courts will enforce Treasury regulations unless they clearly
conflict with the language or intent of the Internal Revenue Code, are
unreasonable, or exceed the scope of the Secretary's power."' Because the
26. See, e.g., Seebold v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 723 (1988); Feldman v. Commissioner,
55 T.C.M. (CCH) 450 (1988).
27. See, e.g., Rothstein v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 488 (1988); Estate of Goodwin v. Commis-
sioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 702 (1988); Farah v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 1282 (1987).
28. Extensive research by this author has not revealed such a case. Many reasons might explain
this gap. First, the Treasury regulations under § 6661 were promulgated only in 1985; many of the
most recent cases coming from the Tax Court involve transactions that antedate the regulations. See,
e.g., Gjesteby v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 1364 (1987) (1982 transactions challenged). Sec-
ond, most tax cases do not reach the courts; a substantial portion are settled. 1985 IRS CONIM'R &
CHIEF COUNSEL ANN. REP. 34, 68 (84.9% of cases not docketed with Tax Court and 89.6% of
docketed cases were settled). Section 6661 and Treas. Reg. § 1.6661 (1985) provide the Service with
more leverage in settlement negotiations because it can threaten to invoke the penalty to 'discourage a
taxpayer's challenge to a revenue ruling or revenue procedure. See also infra note 53 (public tends to
accept interpretative rulings, like revenue rulings, as determinative).
29. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1986). In fact, Internal Revenue Service employees draft the regulations,
which the Secretary usually approves; see Treas. Reg. § 301.7805-1 (1988). I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1986)
contains an exception for certain regulations which the Code specifically requires administrators in
the Service to issue. Congress recently amended § 7805 to require the Secretary to submit all tempo-
rary regulations as proposed rules; it also limits the effect of proposed regulations to three years.
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647 § 6232, 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 3734-35 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 7805(e)-()).
30. The bulk of the material in this Section is derived from four sources: 4 B. BrrsrKER, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiFrs (1981); M. GRAETZ, supra note 13, at 70-75; G.
RICHMOND, FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH (2d ed. 1985); and Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rul-
ings, Reliance and Retroactivity, 43 TAXES 756 (1965).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 557 (1973) (Treasury regulation stricken
because unreasonable); Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939) (regulation
issued in excess of Secretary's authority void); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 447 (1936)
1989] 1439
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Secretary usually follows the APA's notice and comment requirement, 2
and indeed sometimes exceeds it by offering public hearings, Treasury
regulations are not central to the argument of this Note.33
The IRS issues revenue rulings 4 and revenue procedures. 5 These do
not undergo a notice and comment period, but still act as binding rules on
taxpayers. 6 The Commissioner has no authority in the Code to issue rev-
enue rulings other than his general authority derived from the Secretary
of the Treasury's section 7805 power.
The IRS also issues less formal communications. The most frequent are
the letter ruling and private determination, in which the Service's Na-
tional Office or District Directors respectively answer questions from tax-
payers about the tax implications of particular transactions.3" The Service
has only recently begun to publish private determinations but these rul-
(regulation contrary to plain meaning of Code void).
32. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982) (agencies must announce rules prior to promulgation and allow
public to make written comments).
33. But see, e.g., Miscellaneous Federal Tax Matters, 52 Fed. Reg. 2724-25 (1987) (withdrawal
of notices of proposed rulemaking because some can be accomplished by interpretative rules). The
Treasury Department thus recognizes that it might accomplish its ends with less cumbersome proce-
dures than those mandated in the APA.
34. See Rev. Proc. 89-1 § 4.07, 1989-1 I.R.B. 8, 11 (defining revenue rulings and their effect).
Sometimes the Commissioner establishes law through revenue rulings. In Industrial Valley Bank &
Trust v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 272 (1976), the Tax Court noted that "in the field of bad debt
reserves of banks, the applicable rules appear to have been customarily laid down by revenue ruling
rather than by regulation." Id. at 280; see also 4 B. BrrrKER, supra note 30, 110.5.4, at'110-46 to
-48. "As considered expressions of the IRS' views, revenue rulings and regulations differ more in
degree than in kind, and it is not clear that a sharp distinction in their weight is warranted." Id. at
110-47.
35. A "revenue procedure" is an official statement of a procedure published in the Bulletin
that either affects the rights or duties of taxpayers or other members of the public under the
Internal Revenue Code and related statutes and regulations, or, although not necessarily affect-
ing the rights and duties of the public, should be a matter of public knowledge.
Rev. Proc. 86-15 § 3.02, 1986-1 C.B. 544, 544. Compare id. with Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 238
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (creation of new rights or duties distinguishes a legislative rule).
36. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 89-1, 1989-1 I.R.B. 6 (setting applicable federal interest rate for purposes
of I.R.C. § 1274(d) (1986)). Section 1274(d) authorizes the Secretary to promulgate such rules, but
this seems to authorize the issuance of a legislative regulation, i.e. one issued with notice and com-
ment. "Several courts have indicated that, in doubtful cases, rules made pursuant to specific rulemak-
ing powers are more likely to be treated as legislative than are rules made pursuant to general
rulemaking powers." Asimow, supra note 5, at 395.
The IRS has also announced substantive policy in revenue procedures. For the example of depreci-
ation schedules, see Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 C.B. 418 (announcing 1962 depreciation allowance),
revoked by Rev. Proc. 72-10, 1972-1 C.B. 721, superseded by Rev. Proc. 77-10, 1977-1 C.B. 548,
superseded by Rev. Proc. 83-35, 1983-1 C.B. 745, obsoleted by Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674,
clarifed and modified by Rev. Proc 88-22, 1988-18 I.R.B. 38.
37. See Rev. Proc. 89-1 § 8, 1989-1 I.R.B. 8, 13 (describing procedures for obtaining private
rulings and their effect). Letter rulings and determination letters have substantially the same effect.
1440
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ings cannot be relied on as precedent. 8 The Service routinely issues a list
of subjects upon which it will not issue private determinations.3 9
In addition to pronouncements issued to taxpayers, the IRS also an-
nounces its litigation position for future disputes. This policy, called non-
acquiescence, is pursued to indicate the IRS's refusal to adhere to the
precedential effect of a case.4 Sometimes these decisions are announced in
the form of Actions on Decisions; at other times, the Service will announce
its challenge to a decision through a revenue ruling."1 While it usually
will challenge only the rulings of the Tax Court, the Service will some-
times refuse to recognize a decision of a court of appeals.42 The IRS has
never directly challenged a ruling of the Supreme Court.
The Service also announces policy in other forms including General
Counsel Memoranda,' Technical Advice Memoranda," Technical Mem-
38. I.R.C. § 61100)(3) (1986), which governs the rulings program, prohibits the use of written
determinations as precedent. Despite this prohibition, some courts have used letter rulings as a guide
to how the Service has treated taxpayers in similar situations. E.g., Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452
U.S. 247, 261 n.17 (1982); Xerox Corp. v. United States, 656 F.2d 659, 660 & n.3 (Ct. Cl. 1981);
Niles v. United States, 520 F. Supp. 808, 814 & n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The Service itself encourages
the use of private letter rulings as a guide to research. IRS, REVENUE RULING HANDBOOK §
221(1)(a) (1979), reprinted in 6 Internal Revenue Manual-Administration (CCH) 35,995, at
35,995-13 to -14; see also Rogovin, supra note 30, at 765-66 (private rulings often source of revenue
rulings).
39. See Rev. Proc. 89-3, 1989-1 I.R.B. 29. For a good discussion of the reasons for this policy, see
Note, The Availability and Reviewability of Rulings of the Internal Revenue Service, 113 U. PA. L.
REV. 81, 86-94 (1964).
40. See Rogovin, supra note 30, at 771-72 (describing history of policy). If the Commissioner
decides not to acquiesce, he still must follow the case's holding with respect to the taxpayer involved in
the litigation. Even where the Commissioner does acquiesce, he may later decide to relitigate, thus
making reliance by taxpayers on acquiescence a risky business. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S.
68 (1965) (Commissioner may reverse earlier decision to acquiesce); see also Carter, The Commis-
sioner's Nonacquiescence: A Case for a National Court of Tax Appeals, 59 TEMPLE L.Q. 879
(1986) (suggesting national court of tax appeals to inhibit use of nonacquiescence); Rodgers, The
Commissioner "Does Not Acquiesce", 59 NEB. L. REv. 1001 (1980) (same); Note, The Commis-
sioner's Nonacquiescence, 40 S. CAL L. REv. 550 (1967) (suggesting that Commissioner publish all
acquiescences, a policy now followed). See generally Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Fed-
eral Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) (examining practice of nonacquiescence in
federal agencies); Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of
Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REv. 476 (1986) (same).
41. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112, in which the Service concluded that the Eighth
Circuit decided Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973), incorrectly, and that therefore
the IRS would continue to dispute the court's position.
42. See Rogovin, supra note 30, at 771-72. Circuit court rulings only establish precedent for that
circuit; therefore one circuit court cannot make tax law for the nation. See Carter, supra note 40, at
883-85; Rodgers, supra note 40, at 1004.
Under Treas. Reg. 1.6661-3(b)(4)(ii) (1985), taxpayers may cite court cases from any jurisdiction
as substantial authority; the circuit to which they may appeal is not taken into account. However,
"there is substantial authority for the tax treatment of an item if the treatment is supported by con-
trolling precedent of a United States Court of Appeals to which the taxpayer has a right of appeal
with respect to the item." Id.
43. A General Counsel Memorandum (GCM) is a memorandum from the Office of the Chief
Counsel to the Assistant Commissioner (Technical) in response to a formal question. GCM's help the
Assistant Commissioner (Technical) formulate new revenue rulings, private letter determinations, or
Technical Advice Memoranda. See Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 669-71
(D.C. Cir. 1981). Courts sometimes use GCM's as an indicator of IRS policy. See, e.g., Automobile
Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 185-86 & n.12 (citing GCM as beginning of
reversal of policy allowing tax exemption for automobile clubs), reh'g denied, 353 U.S. 989 (1957);
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oranda,45 and remarks by the Secretary of Treasury."6 Courts have cited
all of the pronouncements described in this Section as internal revenue
policy, but the regulations do not permit taxpayers to cite all of them as
authority against the Service.47
II. COMPELLED TAXPAYER DEFERENCE TO IRS INTERPRETATIVE
RULES
The Secretary of the Treasury has issued six regulations under section
6661. One of these, Treasury Regulation 1.6661-3, defines "authority" to
include certain interpretative rules. The distinction between interpretative
and legislative rules is not clear but it has some significance in administra-
tive law. Theoretically, interpretative rules should have less effect than
legislative rules, but courts tend to defer to them equally.4" Because of this
equal deference, if courts enforce Regulation 1.6661-3 as written, they
will compel taxpayers to defer to IRS pronouncements that are supposed
to represent no more than the Service's own interpretation.
A. The Distinction Between Legislative and Interpretative Rules
1. The History of the Distinction
In 1939, President Roosevelt directed Attorney General Murphy to ap-
point a special committee and study administrative procedure in the vari-
ous federal agencies. The number of agencies and their powers had risen
greatly in the New Deal era, and the jumble of idiosyncratic agency pro-
cedure, which then comprised the bulk of administrative law, accom-
plished little except to confuse citizens, conceal agency activity from public
scrutiny, and hide regulations from the government itself. The Attorney
see also Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 279-80 & n.5 (1966) (GCM's part
of array of authority that creates consistent administrative interpretation to which Court will defer).
Taxpayers may not cite post-1955 GCM's as authority for avoiding the 6661 penalty. Treas. Reg. §
1.6661-3(b)(2) (1985).
44. Technical Advice Memoranda (TAM's) respond to questions that District Directors, in the
course of making a private determination, refer to the National Office. They are within the definition
of written determination, I.R.C. § 6110(b)(1) (1986), and therefore may not be cited as precedent.
I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3) (1986). In Woods Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 274 (1985), the Tax
Court used prior IRS interpretations of the Code expressed in a Technical Advice Memorandum to
estop the Commissioner's claim of an amendment, through a new TAM, to a Treasury regulation.
The court suggested that the Commissioner amend the regulation instead. Id. at 281, 282 & nn. 15 &
16.
45. The Commissioner writes Technical Memoranda to the Assistant Secretary of Treasury (Tax
Policy). See Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The
memoranda resemble a legislative history of regulations, and the Service will often rely on them for its
own internal use to explain a regulation. Id. at 672. Taxpayers cannot cite technical memoranda as
authority for 6661 purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-3(b)(2) (1985).
46. Cf Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 169 & n.36, reh'g denied, 362 U.S. 972 (1960)
(using statements by Secretary Mellon as replacement for legislative history).
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-3(b)(2) (1985). But see id. § 1.6661-3(b)(4)(i) (taxpayer permitted to
use written determination as substantial authority if taxpayer is named in determination).
48. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7.9-.11, at 43-57 (1979).
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General's report and recommendations suggested a unified approach to
administrative procedure."9 In 1946, after years of delay and debate, Con-
gress passed the Administrative Procedure Act50 to make administrative
agencies more accountable to the public.
In its final report, the Committee suggested that all administrative
agencies, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue,"' should follow notice
and comment procedures when issuing statutory rules."2 It therefore be-
came necessary to distinguish statutory regulations from interpretative
rules. The Committee recognized that the conceptual "distinction between
statutory regulations and interpretative regulations is . . .blurred by the
fact that the courts pay great deference to the interpretative regulations of
administrative agencies, especially where these have been followed for a
long time." 53 Because interpretative regulations consequently affect pri-
vate interests, the Committee examined the procedures agencies used in
promulgating these rules. 54
When it enacted the APA, Congress recognized that agencies promul-
gate interpretative rules.55 However, both the Senate and the House
wanted agencies to act in good faith and use this exception and all of the
other exceptions in the Act only when necessary. 6 Moreover, Congress
did not think that the exceptions were significant. Rather, it thought
49. U.S. ATTORNEY GEN.'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 5 (1941) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
50. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-552, 553-559, 701-706
(1982)).
51. The name was changed in 1953 to Internal Revenue Service. T.D. 6038, 1953-2 C.B. 443.
52. FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 167.
53. Id. at 100; see also id. at 27 ("But the agency's interpretations are in any event of considera-
ble importance; customarily they are accepted as determinative by the public at large, and even if they
are challenged in judicial proceedings, the courts will be influenced though not concluded by the
administrative opinion."). As an example of this deference, the Committee offered the treatment of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327 (1930), where the Supreme
Court held that "it is the settled rule that the practical interpretation of an ambiguous or doubtful
statute that has been acted upon by officials charged with its administration will not be disturbed
except for weighty reasons." Id. at 336, quoted in FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 100. The Com-
mittee also cited Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936), to show that the Court will reject an
agency determination, even one of long standing, if that interpretation conflicts with the clear terms of
a statute. FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 100 n.23 (citing Koshland).
54. FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 100. Although the Committee said that it would consider
the processes by which interpretative rules are promulgated, the actual impact of their proposals is not
dear. See id. at 195 (rulemaking portion of proposed bill with no specific provision for interpretative
rules); see also id. at 226 (proposed bill in appendix to additional views of McFarland, Stason, and
Vanderbilt, requiring agencies to issue interpretations as rules); 228 (under McFarland, Stason, and
Vanderbilt scheme, interpretative rules issued by notice and comment).
55. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 4(a), 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1982)) (exempting interpretative rules from notice and comment); see also
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S.
Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946) [hereinafter APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (exception
will encourage agencies to make interpretative rules); Asimow, supra note 5, at 385-88 (desirable that
agencies issue interpretative rules and inform public).
56. APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 55, at 18-19, 200, 258. Congress did recognize that
the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued interpretative rules, id. at 357, but believed that the opportu-
nity to challenge rules and petition agencies for new rules would protect the public from arbitrary
action by agencies, id. at 18.
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agency action fell into primarily two categories, rulemaking and adjudica-
tion,57 and for both categories the Act specified procedures that would
protect the public interest. Because interpretative rules would not have a
statute-like impact on the public, no procedures were necessary for their
promulgation.""
2. The Interpretative-Legislative Distinction Today
The distinction between legislative and interpretative rules remains ob-
scure. The Supreme Court has never devised a test for distinguishing in-
terpretative from legislative rules; it has only ruled on how interpretative
rules should be treated by the courts.59 In theory, courts should accord
great deference to legislative rules and review interpretative rules more
carefully, depending on various circumstances, including which agency
promulgated the rule. 0 Because the Supreme Court has offered so little
guidance on distinguishing the two types of rules, the courts of appeals
have created most of the case law in this area.
An interpretative ruling only represents the agency's position for litiga-
tion purposes.6" Since some legislative rules interpret statutes, 2 the type
57. See APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 55, at 14 (adjudication and rulemaking are two
main types of administrative justice); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MAN-
UAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 14 (1947) [hereinafter MANUAL] (describing dichot-
omy between rulemaking and adjudication). As a contemporaneous interpretation of the Act, the
Manual offers good insight into how the executive branch read the APA. The usual distinction be-
tween rulemaking and adjudication is that the former is prospective and the latter is retroactive. Id.
This distinction does not hold up well in the case of the IRS since it may exercise its rulemaking
authority retroactively; indeed, I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1986) presumes that regulations will apply
retroactively.
58. "Another reason [to exclude interpretative rules from notice and comment], which might be
added, is that 'interpretative' rules-as merely interpretations of statutory provisions-are subject to
plenary judicial review, whereas 'substantive' rules involve a maximum of administrative discretion."
APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 55, at 18.
59. The Court has held that rules not promulgated in accordance with the APA do not have the
binding effect of law and cannot constitute an "authorization by law." In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281, 315-16 (1979), Chrysler attempted to prevent the Defense Logistics Agency from re-
leasing to Chrysler's unions equal employment opportunity reports that it had filed with the Agency.
Chrysler claimed that release would violate the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982), which
requires an authorization of law before release is legal. The Court held that an interpretative rule
could not constitute an "authorization of law"; this is as close as it has come to defining a functional
test.
60. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) (APA challenge to Secretary of HEW's
authority to promulgate rules interpreting "unemployment" failed because Congress specifically au-
thorized the interpretation). In Batterton, the Court established guidelines for determining when
courts should defer to agency interpretations: "Varying degrees of deference are accorded to adminis-
trative interpretations, based on such factors as the timing and consistency of the agency's position,
and the nature of its expertise." Id. at 425 n.9.
61. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 48, § 7.13, at 59-64. But see, e.g., Merchant's Indus. Bank v.
Commissioner, 475 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir. 1973). While the court acknowledged that revenue rulings
"do not have the force and effect of law ... and though entitled to consideration, they are accorded
less weight than regulations," id. at 1064, it proceeded to review the challenged agency action under
an abuse of discretion standard rather than treating the agency's position as the position of one party,
id. at 1065.
62. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977) (Secretary of HEW authorized to promul-
gate definition of "unemployment" for 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1982)).
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of action that an agency is performing alone does not distinguish interpre-
tative from legislative rules. In the 1970's, some courts voided purportedly
interpretative rules that were found to have a substantial impact on the
public. 63 Most circuits have since repudiated "substantial impact analy-
sis," however, and instead look to a variety of factors in determining
whether a rule is interpretative." Most notably, courts examine the
agency's intent65 and the effect of the law within the statutory scheme.66
The demise of the substantial impact test came in part from changes in
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court held
that the APA sets a maximum of procedures that courts may require.17 In
Vermont Yankee, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
claimed that nuclear power was so important an issue that the government
should hold hearings on it; the Court nevertheless refused to grant this
relief. This case has caused the circuit courts to become unwilling to im-
pose any procedures on administrative agencies beyond those specified in
section 553.8 Thus, they have defined "interpretative rule" more broadly
and exempted more rules from notice and comment.69
In the IRS context, courts have routinely found numerous IRS pro-
nouncements, particularly revenue rulings,7 0  to be interpretative and
63. The leading case in this area is Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858 (D.
Del. 1970); see also Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972) (adopting sub-
stantial impact test).
64. Arrow Air v. Dole, 784 F.2d 1118, 1122-25 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (factors include: agency charac-
terization of rule as interpretative; whether rule only reminded regulated parties of preexisting duties;
whether sufficient, reasoned analysis was offered to support rule; whether rule embodied longstanding
policy; whether rule created new rights or duties); General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d
1561, 1564-66 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (same factors used), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985);
see also Note, Substantial Impact Test, supra note 6 (most circuits have explicitly repudiated sub-
stantial impact test). But see Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 182 (1st Cir. 1983) (impact of rule is
one factor to take into account in determining whether it is interpretative).
65. No court has ruled that the agency's characterization of the rule is dispositive of the issue, but
many courts have held that the agency's characterization warrants judicial deference. See, e.g., Arrow
Air, 784 F.2d at 1122; General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d at 1565; Energy Reserves
Group v. Department of Energy, 589 F.2d 1082, 1092 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978). Courts have
also held that an agency claim that it has made a binding rule will trigger § 553 procedures. E.g.,
Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740, 742 (3d Cir. 1969).
66. Courts engaging in this "legal effect" jurisprudence often look at the statute to see whether it
is self-executing. See, e.g., Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 183 (1st Cir. 1983). Some courts have
used the substantial impact test together with the legal effects test: Even if the rule has legal effect and
was promulgated without notice and comment, the agency committed mere "harmless error" if the
rule has had no substantial impact. E.g., Energy Reserves Group, 589 F.2d at 1095 (Federal Energy
Administration committed harmless error when it promulgated rule without notice and comment).
67. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). The Court said, "Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights
in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if the
agencies have not chosen to grant them." Id. at 524; see also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232-35
(1974) (agencies may voluntarily bind themselves to greater procedural duties).
68. E.g., Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Vermont Yankee prohibits court
from "engraft[ing] additional procedures on agency action beyond those contemplated by the APA");
see Note, Substantial Impact Test, supra note 6.
69. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 36
(1983).
70. For a definition of revenue rulings, see supra note 34.
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therefore exempt from the APA's notice and comment requirements.
Under Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, interpretative rules are merely the
Commissioner's position for the purposes of litigation, and trial courts
should review the facts "de novo ab initio."7' In Eastern Kentucky Wel-
fare Rights Organization v. Simon,72 the court of appeals reached the
merits of a challenged revenue ruling. The Welfare Rights Organization
challenged Revenue Ruling 69-545, which revoked Revenue Ruling 56-
185. The earlier ruling required tax-exempt hospitals to provide free and
low-cost services to the poor, and the later ruling lifted that requirement.
The court of appeals denied relief to the plaintiffs, holding that revenue
rulings fall into the "interpretative regulations" exception to the APA 3
The revenue ruling had "no independent binding effect and . . . courts
are not bound by it unless they choose to accept it as a proper interpreta-
tion."74 At the same time, however, the court found that the Commis-
sioner's position represented a reasonable interpretation of the term
"charitable" in the context of the Code and did not violate any explicit or
implied congressional intent; therefore, the circuit court allowed the reve-
nue ruling to stand.
Two other decisions have characterized revenue rulings as "classic ex-
amples of an interpretative ruling. 75 Both involved challenges to the issu-
ance of an amendment through revenue ruling to Treasury Regulation
section 1.612-3, which concerned the advancement of royalties from
mines.76 Both courts ruled that section 7805 of the Code took precedence
over the APA, since the Code "reflect[ed] a specific congressional action to
address a particular issue. . . . If two statutes conflict or overlap in ap-
plication, the rule is that the more specific of the two takes precedence. 77
B. The Deference Paid to Interpretative Rules
When a court determines that a rule is interpretative, it holds that the
rule is exempt from notice and comment. This implies, to some extent,
71. 194 F.2d 329, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1952); see infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
72. 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir.) (1975), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
73. 506 F.2d at 1291.
74. Id.
75. Wing v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 17, 26 (1983).
76. In Wing, the court found that the Secretary had properly followed the required notice and
comment for the legislative regulations, and ruled that amendments to the regulation need not undergo
notice and comment. 81 T.C. at 28, 30. In Redhouse v. Commissioner, 728 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984), the court of appeals relied on the Tax Court's Wing decision, but
found that the regulation-an amendment to a legislative rule-was interpretative and therefore need
not undergo notice and comment. Id. at 1253. The court reasoned that the revenue rulings only
corrected an earlier misinterpretation of the original depletion regulations. The complete depletion
regulations, as legislative rules, had to and did pass notice and comment.
77. Wing, 81 T.C. at 30 n.17 (emphasis in original); see also Redhouse, 728 F.2d at 1253 (same).
But see Asimow, supra note 5, at 395 (rule made pursuant to specific delegations of rulemaking
power often considered legislative, not interpretative, and therefore requires notice and comment).
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that the interpretative rule will receive more stringent judicial review.7
However, the level of review that courts in fact apply to interpretative and
legislative rules has converged in recent years."9
Soon after the APA was passed, the D.C. Circuit in Gibson Wine Co.
v. Snyder80 stated that Internal Revenue rulings constitute only the Com-
missioner's interpretation of a section of the Treasury regulations."' In
that case, a producer of boysenberry wine challenged a revenue ruling
which required manufacturers to label boysenberry wine as such, rather
than as blackberry wine. The Gibson Wine Company argued that the
boysenberry, being only a particularly "large and luscious newcomer"8' 2 to
the blackberry family, did not constitute a different species of fruit that
necessitated special labelling.83 The Commissioner disagreed. The District
Court, holding that the Commissioner's position did not bind the court,
"examined the whole question on the merits de novo ab initio, made its
own findings on the evidence before it, and reached its own conclusions
upon the merits," agreeing with the Commissioner.8 The Court of Ap-
peals approved of this level of review for an interpretative rule.8 5
Courts sometimes claim that they exercise more stringent review over
interpretative rulings than those promulgated with notice and comment.8 '
But while no court has repudiated Gibson Wine, courts now tend to be
much more deferential to agency interpretations. The rigor of judicial re-
view reached its nadir in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, where the Supreme Court announced a three-part test for re-
viewing agency legislative rules.87 First, a court should examine the statu-
tory language that the agency interpreted; if the agency's reading is sub-
stantially incorrect or abrogates the clear language of the statute, the court
must invalidate the regulation. 8 Second, if the language of the statute is
unclear, the court should refer to the statute's legislative history and di-
vine Congress's intent.89 Third, if neither the text nor the legislative his-
tory reveal the meaning of the law, the court should defer to the agency's
interpretation."0
78, See supra note 58.
79. ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 69, at 36; Asimow, supra note 6, at 563-65.
80. 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
81. Id. at 331-32.
82. Id. at 335 (Miller, J., dissenting).
83. The dissenting judge suggested that the producers label the wine "Blackberry Wine (Boysen
Variety)" but both the Commissioner's representative and the majority rejected this idea. Id. at 336
(Miller, J., dissenting). The quaffer of berry wines must be especially susceptible to misleading
labelling.
84. Id. at 332.
85. Id.
86. E.g. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977); see also 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 48,
§ 7.11, at 54-57 (agency action that does not come from delegated power cannot bind courts).
87. 467 U.S. 837, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984).
88. Id. at 859-62.
89. Id. at 862-64.
90. Id. at 864-65.
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This increased deference to legislative rules has been extended to inter-
pretative rules. In General Motors Corp. v. Ruckeishaus, the D.C. Cir-
cuit held that an interpretative rule deserves the deference described in
Chevron.91 Similarly, in Arrow Air v. Dole, the court cited Chevron and
stated that "where, as here, two reasonable interpretations are possible,
the agency's view must prevail.""2 In each case, the court adopted the
agency's interpretations.93
In the IRS context, the Supreme Court often defers to Treasury regula-
tions and interpretations. 4 As it said in United States v. Correll,95 "Con-
gress has delegated to the Commissioner, not to the courts, the task of
prescribing" rules under section 7805 of the Code. 8 This policy predates
Chevron by many years; courts have consistently deferred to the expertise
of the Commissioner.
Courts also tend to defer to the Commissioner's interpretative rules. In
Farmar v. United States,97 the Court of Claims summarized the treat-
ment of revenue rulings, one type of interpretative rule:
Revenue rulings are not binding on this court. They are not ac-
corded a presumption of correctness but must be analyzed for consis-
tency with the statute. Nevertheless, they are entitled to some consid-
eration and carry some weight, especially when the statutory
language is considered ambiguous. This stance is consistent with the
general deference accorded an IRS interpretation, as well as the
Commissioner's authority to choose between reasonable
interpretations.98
Courts talk as if IRS interpretative rules are different from legislative reg-
ulations, but, given the tradition of deference to the Commissioner, the
judicial policy towards both is essentially the same.
91. 742 F.2d 1561, 1566-67 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985).
92. 784 F.2d 1118, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
93. Arrow Air involved a challenge to the rule itself, not the application; as such, the judgment
only permitted the Civil Aeronautics Board to apply its interpretative rule. In GM, the EPA sought to
require automobile manufacturers to repair all vehicles of a recall class, regardless of age or mileage
at the time of the repair. The court permitted the agency to apply its interpretation to General
Motors.
94. National Muffler Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476-77 (1979); Bingler v.
Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-51 (1969); Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501
(1948) ("Treasury regulations must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with
the revenue statutes. .. ."); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1940) (dicta); Fawcus
Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931); Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327 (1930).
95. 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
96. Id. at 307; see also id. at 305-07 (explaining policy behind deference).
97. 689 F.2d 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
98. Id. at 1024 n.12 (citations omitted).
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C. The Problem of Compelled Taxpayer Deference
Under section 6661 and its regulations, taxpayers must pay the same
deference to IRS interpretative announcements as courts do, or risk a fine
for the substantial understatement of tax liability. This destroys the theo-
retical and appropriate distinction between legislative and interpretative
rules.
Treasury Regulation 1.6661-3 includes IRS interpretative rulings,
along with the Code, court cases, and legislative rules, as the exclusive
forms of permissible authority.99 The fact that a court may find an inter-
pretative rule substantively correct-or may have a presumption that the
IRS's interpretations are correctZ0 0-does not mean that interpretative and
legislative rules should not be distinguished."' Treasury Regulation
1.6661-3(b)(2) equates the authoritative value of interpretative and legis-
lative rules, and thus violates a basic principle of administrative law, i.e.
the distinction between interpretative and legislative rules.10 2 Courts con-
tinue to characterize interpretative rules as merely the litigating position
of agencies;' 03 it would therefore be unfair to require taxpayers to accept
these rules as though they were law.
Section 6661, as interpreted by Treasury Regulation 1.6661-3, has this
effect. By treating revenue rulings and other interpretative rules as au-
thorities which, if contrary to the taxpayer's position, could negate the
"authority" the taxpayer can cite in her favor, Regulation 1.6661-3
threatens to penalize the taxpayer for failing to defer to the IRS's posi-
tion, which effectively gives it the deterrent power of a law.
In order to escape the substantial understatement penalty, the taxpayer
must show more authority than required under the "reasonable basis"
standard, but need not meet the level required by a "more likely than not"
standard.'" The Service will take all recognized authorities into account
when evaluating substantial underpayment penalties, and recognizes that
"[t]here may be substantial authority for more than one position with re-
spect to the same item.' 01 5 When tax shelters are involved, the taxpayer
must demonstrate not only that substantial authority exists for her posi-
tion, but also that she reasonably concluded (either alone or with the help
99. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-3(b)(2) (1985).
100. Cf Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933) (taxpayer has burden of proof to claim
deduction).
101. The framers of the APA believed that interpretative rules would receive more intense scru-
tiny from courts. See supra note 58.
102. See K. DAVIS, supra note 48, §§ 7.9-.11, at 43-57 (using Nazis as example of administra-
tive agencies run riot).
103. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-3(a)(2) (1985); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 575 (1982) [hereinafter TEFRA CONFERE CE REPORT], reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1190, 1347 (phrase "substantial authority" used to suggest more than "reasonable
basis" but less than "more likely than not").
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-3(b)(1) (1985).
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of a tax advisor) that "there is a greater than 50-percent likelihood that
the tax treatment of the item will be upheld in litigation if the claimed
treatment is challenged. . . ,,.o0 Moreover, the Regulation declares that
"[t]here is substantial authority for the tax treatment of an item only if
the weight of the authorities supporting the treatment is substantial in
relation to the weight of authorities supporting contrary positions."107
This regulation ignores the proper distinction between legislative and
interpretative rules. Neither courts nor the Service should impose substan-
tial understatement penalties solely on the basis of an IRS interpretative
rule. Instead, such penalties should be imposed only if the rule has be-
come accepted in judicial precedent or has passed through notice and com-
ment.'08 Thus, a dear, applicable court precedent or a legislative rule
could become preclusive authority"'0 for the section 6661 penalty.
Precedent should be preclusive authority for the purposes of the section
6661 penalty. These norms are legitimate for two principal reasons: First,
both sides are involved in the dispute (representation); second, the deci-
sionmaker stands independent of the two litigants (neutrality). Courts can
thus transform the litigating position of one party into a legal norm.
Under this proposal, a court-either an Article III court or the Tax
Court"10-could affirm the Commissioner's substantive tax position and
use that decision in the future as authority justifying imposition of section
6661 penalties. But imposing the fine on taxpayers solely because they
challenge an interpretative rule would in some instances penalize them for
advancing colorable positions."' In such cases, the court essentially defers
to one party's litigating position-denying neutrality-without the in-
volvement of the adversely affected party-denying representation.
Notice and comment also generates binding norms, with a somewhat
different basis for their legitimacy. It permits affected parties to partici-
pate in the rulemaking process, thus mirroring some of the values inher-
106. Id. § 1.6661-5(d).
107. Id. § 1.6661-3(b)(1).
108. One exception to this rule might be letter determinations addressed to the taxpayer. See
supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. These might constitute an exception because the taxpayer
requested the ruling. Considering that the IRS can err in its tax advice, this Note does not propose
that letter determinations adverse to the named taxpayer be accorded the "preclusive effect", see infra
note 109 (defining preclusive effect), of a legislative rule or precedent. Letter determinations in favor
of the taxpayer should exculpate her from the substantial understatement penalty in any case.
109. A "preclusive authority" is one that would have a strong presumption of correctness;
"preclusive effect" is the effect that a preclusive authority has, i.e. almost outweighing any other
authority the taxpayer might cite. The intent is to create a level of deference similar to Arrow Air and
General Motors v. Ruckleshaus.
110. The Tax Court is as likely to be neutral as Article III courts. Even though the members of
the Tax Court have terms that expire, I.R.C. § 7443(e) (1986), they are not at the beck and call of
the Internal Revenue Service. Only the President may remove Tax Court judges, and then only with
cause. I.R.C. § 7443(0 (1986).
111. Not all taxpayers who challenge interpretative rules advance colorable positions. Sometimes
taxpayers attempt to challenge longstanding, judicially recognized interpretative positions, and should
pay the § 6661 penalty. See cases cited supra note 27.
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ent in democratic decisionmaking. The historical record strongly supports
applying the notice and comment requirement to the IRS. Both the work
of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure and
the legislative history of the APA indicate that the promulgation of tax
policy was intended to comply with this norm. In its monograph describ-
ing the regulatory process of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Com-
mittee noted that while the Bureau's personnel had the advantages of ex-
pertise, they could benefit from the views of affected parties.112 While the
Committee realized that formal hearings might lengthen the regulations
process, 13 it suggested that the Bureau could publish proposed regulations
in the Internal Revenue Bulletin and invite written commen-
tary-processes which mirror the informal rulemaking of the APA in sec-
tion 553n 1-and pointed to the Alcohol Tax Unit as an example of how
such consultation could help the Bureau formulate more coherent
regulations.1 1
5
There is also a strong policy behind encouraging notice and comment:
It protects due process values and enhances the legitimacy of agency ac-
tion. As Professor Asimow has written:
Public participation promotes fundamental democratic values by en-
hancing the responsiveness of agencies to the interest groups affected
by regulation. It opens the process to groups and individuals with
discordant points of view who might otherwise not have been heard
during the agency's routine process of consultation with the public.
In short, through advance notice and comment, every constituency
has an opportunity to participate in a meaningful manner in making
the laws that will affect it. 16
Notice and comment is not without cost: It can be an expensive proce-
dure that increases the costs of issuing regulations. Some have speculated
that if agencies were required to issue interpretative rules with notice and
comment, informal, unannounced policies would be pursued in their stead,
thus diminishing public knowledge of IRS policy. 17 It is unlikely, how-
112. U.S. ATTORNEY GEN.'s COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, MONOGRAPH No. 22, ADMINIS-
TRATION OF INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS 143-49 (1940) [hereinafter MONOGRAPH]. At one point, the
Committee differentiated Regulations, which were more formal, and Treasury Decisions, or TDs,
which "usually interpret[ed] a particular provision or phase [sic; phrase?] of the law." Id. at 144. One
might establish a rough equivalence between the TDs and today's revenue rulings. See supra note 34
and accompanying text (defining revenue rulings).
113. MONOGRAPH, supra note 112, at 147-48.
114. Compare id. at 148 (proposal to publish proposed regulations and invite commentary) with 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1982) (informal rulemaking through notice and written comment).
115. MONOGRAPH, supra note 112, at 148-49. While recognizing that the Unit dealt with more
technical matters and a more contained and sophisticated group of taxpayers, the Committee observed
that "the Unit's success in soliciting informed opinions should not be wholly ignored in considering
the practicability of the Bureau's outside participation in its rule-making process." Id. at 149.
116. Asimow, supra note 5, at 402.
117. Professor Asimow, id. at 403-04, views notice and comment as an additional cost that dimin-
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ever, that such an extreme reaction would result from the rule proposed in
this Note. Since the proposal is limited to the penalties imposed under
section 6661, the most the IRS could lose from failing to follow notice and
comment is the penalties it might collect from taxpayers who decide to
challenge the rule. The public fisc will not lose the actual taxes owed or
the interest on the back taxes. 18
Interpretative rules cannot make the claim for legitimacy that precedent
or legislative rules can. They do not promote the values of representation
and neutrality that are found in court proceedings, nor do they have the
value of participation found in notice and comment. Instead, interpretative
rules-although frequently well thought out-are simply the agency's ipse
dixit. For that reason, courts have feinted at treating them differently, if
only for rhetorical purposes. The proposal in this section attempts to pre-
serve that distinction.
III. LIMITATIONS ON PROPER AUTHORITY
Even if the proposal suggested above were adopted, the IRS's cabined
interpretation of "authority" would still accord it a great deal of leverage
over the taxpayer. The IRS has restricted the authorities that a taxpayer
may cite in attempting to avoid a section 6661 penalty to include only the
Code, court cases, regulations, and "administrative pronouncements (in-
cluding revenue rulings and revenue procedures)." 1 9 The regulations spe-
cifically exclude other sources that taxpayers and courts routinely refer to,
including less formal administrative pronouncements, opinions by practi-
tioners,12 and conclusions reached in legal periodicals.1 21
This restriction creates problems for taxpayers who end up owing sub-
stantive liability but wish to avoid the penalty. The Regulation makes it
unlikely that the taxpayer will find recognized support for any position
ishes the production of nonlegislative rules because "a regulatory program can function without
them." Id. at 405 (emphasis deleted); see also id. at 404-07 (describing economic model of bureau-
cratic choice); id. at 408 (applying model to IRS).
118. See supra notes 16-18. In addition, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 corrected many of the
substantive loopholes in the Code. Thus, it has controlled some of the loss that might otherwise have
resulted. See M. GRAETZ, supra note 13, at 37, 95.
119. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-3(b)(2) (1985). A taxpayer may also cite Notices and Announcements
if they contain specific language permitting reliance. Rev. Rul. 87-138, 1987-2 C.B. 287.
120. Private practitioners' opinion letters have always posed a problem for the IRS. See Falk, Tax
Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Real Ethics: A Critique of ABA Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAx LAW.
643 (1985) (criticizing ABA standard for opinion letters); Note, Redefining the Attorney's Role in
Abusive Tax Shelters, 37 STAN. L. REV. 889 (1985) (attorneys should not be allowed to issue nega-
tive opinion letters). The Code now penalizes attorneys and other tax professionals for aiding and
abetting understatement of tax liability. I.R.O. § 6701 (1986). To render an opinion letter supporting
a tax shelter, an attorney must believe that the taxpayers will more likely than not realize the tax
benefits promised in the shelter offering. 31 C.F.R. § 10.33(4)-.33(5) (1988). If an attorney could not
reasonably believe in this likelihood, the IRS may disbar that attorney from practice before the Ser-
vice. Id. § 10.50-.51.
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-3(b)(2) (1985).
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the IRS has not already endorsed. 122 The comparison test the Regulation
establishes makes it likely that the IRS's sources will overwhelm the sum
of authorities that could exculpate the taxpayer, or at least diminish their
significance in the total framework of regulations.123
When a taxpayer contests a section 6661 penalty, she should be permit-
ted to cite all of the sources upon which she may rely to exculpate herself
from substantive liability. -12 4 For defense purposes, there is no distinction
between between substantive liability and the fine; thus, the limitation has
no sound basis. Tax procedure should be seen as analogous to Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows a party to make "a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law. .. ,25 Like Rule 11, the suggested amendment of Treasury Regu-
lation 1.6661-3 protects in-court behavior. The proposal still protects the
IRS's substantive conclusion; it only allows a taxpayer to defend against
the penalty using whatever sources possible so long as that use is in good
faith and not abusive.
Another analogy to attorney behavior, one more germane to the tax
context, also suggests itself. In its Formal Opinion 85-352, the American
Bar Association advised that "a lawyer may advise reporting a position on
a return even where the lawyer believes the position probably will not
prevail, there is no 'substantial authority' [with reference to section 6661]
in support of the position, and there will be no disclosure of the position
in the return. ' 126 With regard to tax shelter opinions, the American Bar
Association has argued that an attorney should be able to question a reve-
nue ruling in a tax shelter opinion letter. 27 If attorneys can offer advice
to third parties on the basis of overturning a revenue ruling, taxpayers
should be able to question those rulings without penalty.
122. See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying text (description of IRS pronouncements); see also
cases cited supra note 26 (§ 6661 penalty not imposed only because Service's factual determinations
about taxpayer's transactions were incorrect).
123. This argument presumes that the IRS will not contradict itself within the set of relevant
pronouncements. Courts will strike revenue rulings if they are contrary to law, Commissioner v. En-
gel, 464 U.S. 206, 225-26 (1984) (revenue ruling concerning depletion allowance contrary to law and
hence void), but this will only help the taxpayer challenging the revenue ruling if she wins on the
substantive tax claim. If the taxpayer loses on that issue, then the substantial understatement penalty
may be imposed.
124. For example, a taxpayer could cite a GCM for her position. Even though the Court has said
that taxpayers may not rely on GCMs and that Treasury may reverse its own GCMs, Dixon v.
United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965), an uncontradicted GCM should provide some weight to a tax-
payer's claim of substantial authority. Similarly, a taxpayer should be able to cite a treatise, article, or
student note in support of her position.
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. A party need not cite cases to make its good faith argument but can rely
on other sources. See Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177, 184 (7th Cir. 1985)
(court exonerates party from Rule 11 sanction because judges had disagreed on merits earlier).
126. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985), re-
printed in 39 TAx LAW. 631 (1985).
127. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 82-346 (1982), cited in
Falk, supra note 120, at 656 n.54.
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IV. IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSALS
These proposals could be effected either by judicial interpretation of
section 6661 or through statutory amendment. It is unlikely, however, that
a court would reinterpret Treasury Regulation 1.6661-3 in the manner
suggested here because of the deference suggested by the Chevron test.128
First, the language of section 6661 is ambiguous regarding the exclusion
of interpretative rules. Evaluating section 6661 under the second test, con-
gressional intent, some language in the legislative history implies that sec-
tion 6661 should apply to interpretative rules.12 9 Moreover, even if one
treats the legislative history as ambiguous, the Chevron default treatment
for agency regulations is to defer to agency discretion, and therefore the
interpretation of "authority" in Treasury Regulation section 1.6661-3(b)
would probably be accepted.
All challenges to agency action face increased deference to agency dis-
cretion after Chevron. But in the taxation context particularly, a statutory
approach may be the only solution. First, the courts have a longstanding
tradition of deference to the Commissioner's position." Second, some
courts have interpreted the specific grant of rulemaking authority in sec-
tion 7805 of the Code as a limit on the application of the APA, 31 despite
the intention of the APA framers to have heightened judicial review for
interpretative regulations."3 2
A statutory proposal might also be the more effective solution. When
considering the reasonability of tax regulations, courts sometimes rely on a
legal fiction embodied in the doctrine of legislative reenactment. In short,
the doctrine provides that if an agency issues a regulation and Congress
amends any part of the Code-even a section unrelated to the challenged
regulation-courts will defer even more to the agency's discretion because
Congress could have amended the Code to overrule the agency's regula-
tion."' This doctrine makes heroic assumptions about the efficacy of con-
128. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, reh'g denied, 468
U.S. 1227 (1984); see supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (describing three-part test).
129. See TEFRA CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 104, at 575, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 1347.
130. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Wing v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 17, 30 n.17 (1983).
132. See supra note 58.
133. See Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 283 (1966) (repeated passage
of depreciation provision indicates congressional acceptance of agency interpretations); Lykes v.
United States, 343 U.S. 118, 126-27, reh'g denied, 344 U.S. 937 (1952) (Congressional amendment
of unrelated sections of Code suggests acceptance of all regulations); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S.
79, 83 (1938) ("Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without substantial change,
applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received congressional
approval and have the effect of law."); Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 337 (1930) ("The substantial
reenactment in later Acts of the provision theretofore construed by the department is persuasive evi-
dence of legislative approval of the regulation."); Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d
1278, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("This action or inaction by Congress cannot be interpreted as disap-
proving the new ruling. Congress could have rejected the ruling had it determined that it was not in
conformity with the Code."), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1975).
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gressional oversight. Usually, when members of Congress pass tax legisla-
tion, they do not concern themselves with the entire Code but rather look
at specific provisions in the Code to amend. 134 Nevertheless, Congress has
amended the Code several times since the enactment of section 6661, and
it has amended the Code after the promulgation of the regulations under
section 6661." 5 The precedential impact of the legislative reenactment
doctrine might therefore preclude any reinterpretation of "authority" ex-
cept by Congress.
Despite these obstacles, a court could implement this Note's proposal.
Deference under Chevron applies only if the agency's interpretation is
reasonable.1 6 A court could hold that Regulation 1.6661-3 is not reasona-
ble given the background of administrative law and the previously unlim-
ited definition of "authority." A court might also view the Taxpayers' Bill
of Rights as a congressional mandate to limit the effect of Treasury regu-
lations. In addition, the legislative history of section 6661 states that Con-
gress intended that "the courts will be free to look at the purpose of this
new provision in determining whether substantial authority existed for a
position taken in any particular case."1 37 This suggests that courts, not
Treasury, should develop standards of authority. As a predictive matter,
however, it is unlikely that a court would adopt the amendments sug-
gested here.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note urges an improvement in the balance between governmental
efficiency and governmental responsiveness. The IRS faces the enormous
burden of executing, explaining, and, to some extent, determining how the
United States government taxes its citizens, but this duty does not create
unrestrained power to determine all tax policy. Because the regulations
currently ascribe value to the Commissioner's litigating position, taxpay-
ers face fines for questioning the Commissioner's view. The regulations
also deny taxpayers the ability to use authorities they might otherwise use
to escape substantive liability.
This problem has been created by the increasing amount of deference
that courts have paid to administrative agencies over the past decade. As
this problem is amplified in the context of section 6661, Congress might,
when considering amending that section, also consider limiting the defer-
ence courts pay to interpretative rules. A return to the de novo ab initio
134. See, e.g., acts cited supra note 1. In those acts, Congress amended only portions of the Code.
Courts often describe legislative reenactment as a possibility, not a reality. See, e.g., Lykes, 343 U.S. at
126-27; Eastern Kentucky, 506 F.2d at 1289.
135. See supra note 1 and sources cited therein.
136. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843, reh'g denied,
468 U.S. 1227 (1984).
137. TEFRA CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 104, at 575, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 1347.
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standard of Gibson Wine would hew more closely to the original intent of
the APA and would give interpretative rules their proper effect.
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